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23 October 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 42/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

BUIS COMMENTS ON NEUTRON BOMB DEPLOYMENT, COHEN'S NEW BOOK

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 3-11 May 80 pp 64-65

[Commentary by Georges Buis on the book "Echec a la Guerre" [Holding War in Check]*by Samuel T. Cohen and Marc Geneste, Editions Copernic, 1980, 252 pages]

[Text] The introduction of a fearsome type of explosive device, the nuclear weapon, into the arsenals of the major belligerents was certainly not enough to get the Soviets to reject the "phenomenon of war." They simply set about integrating this nuclear firepower into their combat forces. There is no lack of Soviet statements to this effect. General Zavyalov has declared that "nuclear firepower will clear the way for the attacking forces." The renowned Marshal Sokolovski developed the same concept in his book "Military Strategy." Colonel Sirodenko has said quite bluntly that "the nuclear attack is a simultaneous attack throughout the depth of the opposing disposition of forces." In short, the Soviet military intelligentsia consider nuclear firepower to be the instrument for breaking through enemy defensive positions (while NATO still relies on tanks for such penetration!).

In their book "Echec a la Guerre," Samuel T. Cohen and Marc Geneste contend that within the European theater, the neutron bomb alone can preclude nuclear fire from making any opening in the NATO defensive system, or can, in any case, immediately close any such breach. They explain this bomb in a book which brings nuclear physics within everyone's grasp, and in which the caustic fury of the French officer angered at having his views ignored to date blends very effectively with the unruffled humor of the tenacious American scientist.

Death Strip

Before becoming the father of the "enhanced-radiation bomb"--the weapon's correct designation--, Samuel T. Cohen worked at Los Alamos, beginning in 1943, alongside of Neils Bohr, Fermi, and Oppenheimer. There he witnessed the birth of the first atomic bomb, and also of the two bombs which successively leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then he and his friends kept developing

*For additional reviews of, commentary on, and reaction to "Echec a la Guerre" see JPRS 76369, 5 September 1980, No 1618 of this series pp 1-17.

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increasingly powerful bombs. Cohen saw the radius of damage drawn on target maps grow larger and larger, until one day he said to himself: "After all, there must be a way of killing the sniper in the church tower without razing the whole diocese." He reached the conclusion that the solution lay in an explosive device based on nuclear fusion and no longer on nuclear fission which is utilized in current tactical nuclear weapons. In the neutron bomb developed by Cohen, this fusion is the reaction between two heavy isotopes of hydrogen, namely deuterium and tritium.

In a fission-type weapon, 85 percent of the energy released occurs in the form of blast, heat, light, etc., and 5 percent in the form of neutrons. With the fusion-type bomb, the opposite occurs. "Some 80 percent of the energy is emitted in the form of very high-speed neutrons capable of traveling greater distances in air." The explosion becomes "an extremely brief flash of nuclear radiation: neutrons." Hence it is possible to employ, for example, against personnel in the open--and against armored vehicles which neutrons readily penetrate--a fusion-type weapon of 10 times less yield than a fission-type weapon of similar neutron strength. Inasmuch as attacking troops, whether or not they are shielded by armor, are compelled to advance at ground level, they are, therefore, vulnerable and can be effectively counterattacked because the miniaturized neutron weapon can be fired at short range and the defensive troops are, unlike the attackers, under cover.

The other side of these important and unquestionable qualities is that, to avoid slaughtering civilian populations, neutron bombs must of necessity be used on a glaxis forming a continuous strip or belt of terrain all along the demarcation zone, and to the east of that zone as much as possible. Friendly populations to the west would have to be either evacuated once the defensive line is built, or instructed in withdrawing to nearby shelters (1.5 meters of earth divide the radiation effect by 1,000). Defending troops would be deployed throughout a sort of nuclear Maginot Line consisting of five rows of bunkers disposed in depth and protected by a "standard barrier of obstacles," by a "radiological minefield," or also, as Cohen recommends, by a system of pipes containing a radioactive fluid with a base of sodium carbonate in solution. This final obstacle could be built at unbeatable prices and would make it possible "to distribute radioactivity all along the barrier." Destruction teams attacking it would thereby destroy themselves.

Such a defense system would be much less expensive than the present flexible response system which is illogical in every respect and dooms NATO to having its back broken at the outset by a preemptive nuclear strike launched by the Warsaw Pact forces. Cohen and Geneste have no illusions, however, about their proposed system's chances of adoption. Admittedly the employment of neutron bombs is called for--in a manner of speaking--in the unpopulated vastness of steppes and deserts, and even more so on the oceans. We have been saying this for a long time in this very magazine. But the neutron bomb is too revolutionary to be accepted for use on land where, for the time being, the taboo of Hiroshima still stands as an obstacle. Samuel T. Cohen is quite familiar with this taboo. He told us about some 20 years of

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disappointing briefings given to high-level White House and Pentagon officials. The day S. T. Cohen arrived at the White House for a reluctantly approved meeting with Eisenhower, the president could not see Cohen because he was practicing on the White House putting green. General Curtis Le May, a proven scrapper and excellent technical journeyman but a poor air force chief staff, believed that the only good bomb was, once and for all, the one "capable of razing by itself alone the entire Soviet Union." As for John Kennedy and Robert McNamara, they were both prisoners--and probably, as Americans, they were not wrong--of the conviction that employment of nuclear weapons at the very outset would automatically lead to escalation.

The authors also realize that objections impossible to overcome for political reasons will persist. The primary objection is that the FRG, rightly fascinated by the Ostpolitik, will probably never allow construction on its soil of a nuclear wall opposite the Warsaw Pact's bondstone and barbedwire wall.

Furthermore, the system is effective only if authority to fire is delegated at all times to the force commander or even to the bunker commander. But the latest American field service regulation--FM100-16, Operations--revises the present (and highly contingent) overall nuclear weapon employment authority delegated by the President of the United States to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and introduces an additional element of control by reserving to the occupant of the White House the right to personally open fire with nuclear weapons, round by round, whether it be concentrated fire or not

One-Shot Game

There is one point on which the authors have not fully convinced us, even though Samuel T. Cohen did go into greater "detail"--during a lengthy and free-wheeling conversation with us--about his active participation in the searching analyses made of this subject in the Pentagon and NATO. The point in question is the ratio of friendly "civilian" deaths to enemy military deaths in the center of Europe. Cohen did acknowledge, of course, that with the "tactical" fission-type bomb currently in service, three or four civilians would be killed for every military individual because of the magnitude of the collateral effects (houses collapsing, blast, etc.). He asserted, however, that small neutron bombs fired with pinpoint accuracy as artillery shells by a 155-mm gun, for example, would reverse this ratio several times in favor of the civilian population. And why not, after all, if--as in the days of the Roman Empire's Limes or Vauban's glacis--the right-minded civilian populations agree to evacuate the area or stay there and live on the alert close to their underground shelters? But what government will force this choice and obligation upon them?

This is, therefore, a book which raises, once again, the issue of fortress warfare, a type of warfare that was not always like the static, bogged-down Maginot Line warfare. It was a type of warfare which was often the indispensable basis of dynamic "operative" tactics. It was a war of peoples who, in defense of their freedom, chose to play the one-shot game of life

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and death: the city of Beziers against Simon de Montfort, the city of Tyre against Alexander the Great, and hundreds of others. It does seem that the time for such wars is past.

In any event, it is our very firm opinion that where France is concerned, use of the neutron bomb is conceivable solely in operations at sea or in the desert, even though such use would still be undesirable. The neutron bomb can be included for such purposes in France's nuclear arsenal. Its use inside France proper would be completely stupid. With its strategy of deterrence, France has set itself up as a sanctuary and anything that questions the sanctuary's validity is antideterrent for the time being. The neutron bomb could be a remarkable instrument for the defense of Europeans--which Europeans?--the day Europe--which Europe?--is finally built. In that case, it would be the weapon of a line of demarcation whose alinement and defense are not France's problem for the moment.

The fact remains, however, that Marc Geneste and Samuel T. Cohen--who constantly take turns in expressing their views--do prompt some very necessary strategic reflection by presenting to the public the first coherent argument in favor of the neutron bomb.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

PCF TREASURER'S REPORT--PCF Treasurer Georges Gosnat has presented a disturbing report to the political bureau of the party: money is coming in very slowly. The militants are complaining of being asked to contribute too often. Georges Marchais is supposed to make an appeal soon for help in financing his campaign [for the presidency], to add to the problem. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 10 Oct 80 p 32]

GAS RATION TICKETS--Gas ration tickets are ready, says [Minister of Industry] Andre Giraud who adds, however, that "rationing is not foreseen at present." To be distributed by the mayors' offices, the tickets would be the same for everyone regardless of the size of his vehicle. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 10 Oct 80 p 32]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

FIAT'S PROGRESS REPORT FOR FIRST HALF OF 1980

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 24 Sep 80 p 10

[Article by r.v.: "Fiat--Sector by Sector"]

[Text] Turin--The Fiat group on 30 June achieved a total billing volume of 10,423 billion lire (the sum of all of the billing volumes of the various activity sectors, including trade between sectors), as against 8,392 during the first half of 1979. Looking at the net volume of exchange between the group's sectors, the consolidated billing volume rose from 7,311 to 8,976 billion lire. Investments came to 381 billions as against 358 during the same period of time a year ago; as of 30 June, there were 354,786 employees, compared to 356,514 12 months earlier. The Fiat group's financial position, again as of 30 June, revealed a net surplus of 1,588 billions, with an overall improvement of 100 billions as compared to the similar position on 31 December 1979. Available assets as of that date were used partly to finance the group's companies and partly they were invested in bank deposits or short-term government securities. These facts are contained in the report from Fiat Spa [Limited Company] to CONSOB [National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange] (the special commission for checking on stock companies and the exchange) as to the group's progress during the first half of the year, characterized "by the abrupt reversal of the trend registered in the international economy starting in the spring." The report to the CONSOB also contains the progress of the various operational sectors.

Automobiles

The decline in the European auto market was confirmed by the results of the first half of 1980 but in many countries exceeded the most pessimistic expectations: at the end of June, the European demand (excluding Spain and Italy) was 11.2 percent less than during the same period of time in 1979.

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This negative phenomenon has taken on a generalized character in various countries: France and Germany as of 30 June showed figures 7.1 percent and 12.5 percent, respectively, lower than the demand for the first half of 1979; the English market was 15.7 percent lower and for the United States, the reduction was 18.5 percent.

Only in Italy did the demand during the first half of the year hold up, totalling 100,000 registrations more than in 1979; but this increase--by the way, already figured in the company forecasts--was anything but sufficient to compensate for the severe decline registered abroad. As a matter of fact, the overall drop on the European market (including Italy and Spain) was 8.2 percent as of the end of June. Besides, it is feared that, by the end of the year, there may be a lineup of the Italian market with the negative tendency on markets all over the world.

In addition to the drop in the European demand, there were other factors which negatively influenced Fiat Auto: the repercussions, in 1980, from the production losses due to strikes throughout last year; the decline in competitiveness also because of the difference in inflation between Italy and the other European countries, not followed by an adjustment of rates of exchange; the Japanese attack, whose effect by itself at least accounts for one-half of the decline in Fiat Auto sales on export markets. Abroad, as a matter of fact, Fiat sales dropped 22 percent, slipping from 367,000 units during the first half of 1979 to 287,000 in 1980. Excluding Italy and Spain, the share of Fiat automobiles in Europe dropped from 5.1 percent 1979 to 4.1 percent in 1980 as against an increase achieved by the Japanese auto makers from 7.9 percent to 11.1 percent.

In Italy, where Fiat penetration came to 52.4 percent at the end (as of 50.3 percent in the middle of 1979), we must report the success of the new models: "Panda" (65,000 units shipped between February and June); "Ritmo diesel" (11,500 units sold, the most widely used diesel model); and "Lancia Delta" (18,000 units sold).

Fiat Auto sales overall turned out to be 2.1 percent less than last year (808,000 units, including vehicles produced by foreign licensee companies and distributed by the Fiat network, as against 825,000). Italian output during the first 6 months of 1980 came to about 777,000 passenger cars and commercial vehicles of the Fiat, Lancia, and Autobianchi makes; the 11.6 percent increase however took place against the background of the fact that the first half of 1979 was heavily penalized by the labor union conflicts over contract renewals. Foreign production under Fiat license during the first half came to about 498,000 units (5 percent more than 1979).

The output increase however was not paralleled by an increase in sales and that caused an excessive stock surplus which is why Fiat Auto was forced, during the first half of the year, to ask the Earnings Insurance Fund to step in and help for 7 days in taking care of about 78,000 employees, before the summer shutdown, plus another 8 days in September.

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The latest petroleum price rises, the policies aimed at containing inflation, as adopted by various countries, lead us to expect a decline in the demand on all of the European markets during 1980, amounting to about 6 percent as compared to 1979. In Italy, however, the demand went up during the first half, after years of depressed market: the IBECO made shipments involving about 25,000 units (up 35 percent compared to 1979). In spite of some unknowns regarding the progress during the second half, total sales as of the end of the year should be slightly higher than what they were last year.

In France and Germany we anticipate a demand decline of 3 percent by the end of the year whereas a drop of 15 percent is forecast in Great Britain.

IVECO obtained a market share of 10 percent in France (10.4 percent in 1979), 11.3 percent in Germany (11.1 percent in 1979), and 4.8 percent in Great Britain (4.4 percent in 1979). In the other Western European countries IVECO achieved sales that were 13 percent above the 1979 level whereas the increase was 25 percent on markets outside Europe.

Overall, output during the first half of 1980 came to 67,983 units in the various countries (up 15 percent compared to 1979); sales rose to about 60,000 units (up 19.8 percent).

Earth-Moving Machinery

During the first half of 1980, the decline in the American market in relation to the economic crisis in progress was further aggravated. Fiat-Allis came to feel that serious situation by registering a drop in North American sales whereas better results were achieved in Latin America, in the Far East, and Australia. In Europe, Fiat-Allis sales turned out an average of 10 percent higher, particularly due to the positive developments on the French and Italian markets.

Overall, during the first half of 1980, 4,896 earth-moving machinery units were produced by Fiat-Allis, 9.9 percent more than in 1979, and 5,051 units were sold, an increase of 4.3 percent.

Farm Tractors

In spite of a noticeable drop in the tractor demand, both on the European markets, and in the developing countries and the United States (between 12 and 30 percent less than in 1979), sales of Fiat Trattori and Agrifol-Toselli during the first half were substantially in line with last year's levels. By way of confirmation of the product's high quality, it is significant to note the volume of exports which amounts to about 60% of the output; in Europe, Fiat Trattori holds first place with about 12.5 percent of the market.

Fiat Trattori is continuing to increase its output (28,500 units and 8,650 series sold, amounting to an increase of 10 percent over 1979) and the

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same is true of Agriful-Toselli (2,500 units, up 38 percent). High-power (110-180 hp) tractor production was advanced during the first half of the year, completing the range of the 80 Series.

Steel Industry

During the first 6 months of the year, the steel industry maintained positive progress throughout Western Europe: in Italy, cast steel production, as in the other EEC countries (excluding Great Britain), went up 16 percent; imports grew by 30 percent exports dropped 13 percent.

The total billing volume of Teksid, with the companies under its control, came to 963 billion lire during that period of time (up 40 percent compared to the figure as of 30 June 1979). The billing volume for customers outside the Fiat Group from Teksid Spa was equivalent to 34.8 percent, while exports rose 38 percent as compared to 1979.

Components

The total yield of this sector came to about 970 billion lire as against 688 billion lire during the same period of time in 1979. This increase is due to the new joint-venture operations carried out in some countries (COMIND in Spain, Weber in the United States, etc.), as well as the increase in the demand in the automotive vehicle sector in Italy as compared to 1979. Foreign sales were reduced due to the loss of competitiveness resulting from the difference in inflation in Italy as compared to the other countries.

Machine-Tools

The companies in this sector developed a production volume of more than 147 billion lire, getting orders in many countries; in addition to operations conducted in France (Renault, Citroen, Peugeot), Poland, Romania, the GDR, we must report the transactions in progress with Chrysler (United States), BMW [Bavarian Motor Works] and Ford (West Germany), Rolls-Royce (Great Britain), the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and India.

Civil Engineering

During the first half there was a decline in the worldwide market for infrastructure projects and a shift in the demand in the various countries toward energy, mining, agricultural, and social projects. The Impresit Group managed to increase its order volume in Nigeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and also on the Italian market.

Energy

Aviation engines. In the military engine sector, production was launched for the European aircraft named Panavia-Tornado in addition to the effort now under way on the G222 and MB339 aircraft. Development was started

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on the engine for the new Italian Amx fighter plane and in the civilian sector, planning was begun for the JT10D-232 engine for commercial aviation during the second half of the eighties.

Thermomechanical-Nuclear. The new turbogas power plants were completed at Pietrafitta and Alessandria for ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] and Lavrion in Greece; other major projects are underway in Italy and abroad.

Railroad Systems

The government program submitted to parliament during the first half of 1980 to boost and modernize the lines and rolling stock of the Italian railroad network is rather limited with subsequent negative influence on activities in this sector. The purchase of 100 electric streetcars by the Turin Transport Agency is particularly significant.

Tourism and Transportation

The business volume achieved by Ventana during the first half of 1980 was maintained and came to about 50 billion lire. Ventana Inc., of New York, started operating, while the reorganization of the Valtur Group and the Sita Group was completed.

Miscellaneous

As far as the other industrial companies of the Fiat Group are concerned, Telettra recorded a 9-percent increase in orders obtained during the first half of 1980, as compared to 1979 (46 percent come from abroad); the Nebiolo company increased its order volume during the same period of time from 30.4 to 40.2 billion lire with a billing volume, as of 30 June, amounting to 13.8 billions; Sorin Biomedica and Bentley Laboratories registered an increase in their sales volumes likewise in relation to new generations of products.

Operations of Fidis continued positively during the first half of 1980 which, as we know, among other things, controls the companies that handle the financing for sales activities, in Italy, for products of the Fiat Group (IFA, SCUI, UFI, Sava Leasing).

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

POLITICAL PROFILES OF UCD LEADERSHIP FIGURES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17, 20 Jul, 3, 10, 24 Aug, 14 Sep 80

[Articles about or interviews with Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Pio Cabanillas, Landelino Lavilla Alsina and Rodolfo Martin Villa]

[20 Jul 80, pp 22-23: Article on Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic Center Union (UCD)]

[Text] Suarez is irreplaceable at the moment, but if the UCD does not take in other factions and democratize its internal workings, it could disintegrate, Christian Democrat leader Fernando Alvarez de Miranda cautions.

Every so often, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Jesus Esperabe de Arteaga, Jose Luis Ruiz Navarro and Francisco Soler Valero (all of whom belong to the UCD) meet over lunch at a Madrid restaurant with Luis Gomez Llorente, Pablo Castellano and Rafael Escuredo, from the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. Despite their distinct party affiliations, the get-together raises no suspicions whatsoever among the ranks of the two major parties.

They are simply members of the old congressional board who get together more often than the boards of directors of some parties at these luncheons to recall old times, such as when they guided the transition from the halls of Parliament.

The 56-year old Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, a UCD Christian Democrat leader, still feels nostalgia for that era of consensus and blames many of the ills besetting the country on the fact that Centrists and Socialists have gotten caught up in the struggle for power without having completely charted the basic coordinates outlined by the constitution.

"The first Constitutional Assembly was dissolved hastily," he explains when asked about the country's current crisis. "It was done hastily

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because we had already completed the strictly constitutional tasks but we had overlooked such important matters as the autonomy statutes, in other words, the entire framework of the new state."

He speaks with a kindly expression that reflects a well-meaning spirit generally recognized by his fellow party members and political adversaries. His words do not betray the slightest bit of nostalgia for the chairmanship that he had to yield to Landelino Lavilla, another party "baron."

Of all of the members of the UCD Standing Committee and, therefore, of the party's leadership, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda is talked about the least as a possible replacement for Suarez. Ambition does not seem to be the forte of the man who used to be president of the former Christian Democrat People's Party (PPDC) and the inspiration of the Christian Democrat Party that later joined the UCD.

Of all those who joined the centrist coalition, Alvarez de Miranda's men have caused the least trouble and, according to them, have profited the least from power.

Nevertheless, Fernando Alvarea de Miranda is not sorry that he joined the UCD. "I think that time has proven me right vis-a-vis those who doubted the center coalition's effectiveness and its potential for becoming a great party," he explains with conviction. "However, I think that we did not do enough at the time to bring in other forces at the outset that could have given the UCD a different image. I am referring specifically to the spring of 1977, when the UCD was being set up and when Paco Fernandez Ordonez and I tried to bring in the entire Christian Democrat team."

If that endeavor had worked out, Alvarez de Miranda thinks that Adolfo Suarez would probably not be president today or at least he would be a different Suarez.

"Suarez would not have stepped down into the political arena," he asserts. "Suarez would have limited his role to the transition period. He himself conveyed that to us when he invited us to form the UCD. It was only when we demonstrated our inability to reach an understanding among the various parties forging the coalition that Suarez had to enter the picture."

Adolfo Suarez "is the only leader at this historic moment for the party," according to Alvarez de Miranda. But this does not shield the government president from criticism by the Christian Democrat leader: "A man with his qualities is perhaps very useful in a bargaining stage, but perhaps he does not have the experience for the parliamentary stage that we are in now, after the consensus has fallen apart."

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In his opinion, this explains the deterioration of Adolfo Suarez's image. "He is not experienced," he reasons, "because he probably has some misgivings about the entire process of parliamentary democracy, and all of this explains why Suarez has hit an all-time low in his political standing with the censure motion." For a moment, the proximity of the Madrid Stock Exchange, across the street from his office at the Humanism and Democracy Foundation, seemed to have influenced his choice of words.

The foundation takes up some of his time. Although it is not exclusively a UCD organ, it helps to spread the UCD's ideological message in society. With the Congress, the chairmanship of the Inter-Parliamentary Committee, the chairmanship of the Palencia UCD (he represents the province as a deputy) and the chairmanship of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, all of Fernando Alvarez de Miranda's available time is devoted to politics.

In citing his jobs, he does not mention his membership on the UCD Standing Committee, perhaps because he does not care for how it has operated so far.

"The meetings have been very inconsistent," he says. "At some we have talked about purely incidental issues, such as party dues or dues for certain activities, and at others we have tackled the basic strategy for the crisis. But in general, things are not tied together, because when we sit down for a meeting, most of the time we do not know what the agenda is."

Alvarez de Miranda's criticisms of the party cover all of its factions and agencies but boil down to basically one: the lack of internal democracy. The president "has governed too much by himself, with his team, the company, which has basically consisted of him and two others. The Political Council or the Executive Committee meets once in a blue moon, and each meeting is hardly a cataclysmic event for the media or the party itself." And then there is the parliamentary group; "when the deputies themselves vote, in most cases they are unfamiliar with the background of the legislative bill. There is a lack of teamwork between the parties, not just the UCD, and their parliamentary groups, which comes down to nothing other than a lack of democratic input."

Nevertheless, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda is not a prophet of doom about his party, because although "is it subject to very heavy internal pressures from its various factions, I think," he says as if to console himself, "that at least as far as parliamentary voting is concerned, the UCD has shown that it has a clear concept of unity, unity within plurality."

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Fernando Alvarez de Miranda

He feels that the issue of factions cannot be ignored. The party must acknowledge and accept them. "Even though the bylaws apparently do not officially recognize factions, I think that it would be absurd and even undemocratic not to allow these factions, which represent stands, to exist and consolidate within the party. Regardless of all that is said, there are often differing positions within the party among the Catholic Nationals, who follow the Tacito line, the People's Party, whose most prominent figure is the president of Congress, and the Social Democrats, or the Liberals or the Social Christians."

There is a point at which Fernando Alvarez de Miranda seems to lose his composure and natural affability, which during his term as president of Congress led some to accuse him of being weak, and resort to irony. This is when the conversation turns to "the young Turks," the movement within the UCD that favors a centralized party without leading figures, families or factions.

"Someone in Congress said jokingly that they were not young Turks," he comments with a waggish smile, "but rather a Moorish guard. I think

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that they are just a self-defense movement by many people in the party who did not hold a specific position and have become a mere interest group. I find this wholly respectable, but it is clearly an interest group that does not, I think, have major influence in the party.

"Someone might try to sweep the leaders of the various families from power," he thinks out loud, "and he even might succeed...But I think that it would be an enormous error from the standpoint of the party itself, because we would lose the party's most fruitful avenues for building its ideological content and it would then become a purely tim-serving party without any future at all."

The disagreements that have existed and still exist within the UCD are minor matters to Fernando Alvarez de Miranda: "The major battles, the major debates within the party," he explains, "have never been ideological struggles between Christian Democrat and Liberal thought. We have always reached an agreement. There have always been compromise stands. The confrontations have been between personal interests, and these personal interests would be much more violent and unmanageable in a party like the one they want to fashion by eliminating these ideological factions."

Could the UCD break up if next fall the PSOE again goes on the attack and attempts another censure motion? The Christian Democrat leader does not consider it likely: "It is highly unlikely that any UCD faction would consider the possibility of supporting a motion of censure, even partially. I would emphasize that in its plurality of factions the UCD has demonstrated the great extent of its unity. Discontent can cause uneasiness, protests, criticism. But it is a long way from that to saying: Let's break up the party..."

He concedes, however, that there could be surprises, because the debate in the UCD Congress could be harsh, especially with regard to internal democratization, "the major bone of contention" for the autumn assembly. The people who now head up the UCD will either have to conform to the democratic practices that prevail in all parties in systems similar to ours, or the outcome could be catastrophic, even in the view of the moderate and hardly alarmist Alvarez de Miranda.

"Either they conform," he says at the close of our talk, "or they could cause the breakup of a party that, no matter what people would like to believe, has many things going for it at the moment but that has to emphasize self-evaluation, internal criticism, debate...This enriches the party, which needs it, and if it does not do so, I think that it would be utopian to believe that the Congress can save the party."

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[17 Jul 80, pp 17-19 : Interview with Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, by Manuel R. Mora; date and place not given]

[Text] He is a "baron" in his own right and, they say, one of the most factious. Fifty-year old Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, from Madrid, an attorney, Social Democrat and author of the fiscal reform, has won on his own a place of honor on the road of transition.

His political career has been a long one, from president of the National Institute of Industry (INI) under General Franco to finance minister in the democracy. He is a specialist in government finance and a devotee of poetry. Borges is his prophet: "Each instant of my dream or vigil is matched by another of the blind coin."

Fernandez Ordonez's life has been somewhat like that in recent years: a vigil to make this country more rational and just.

But that "blind coin," the fiscal reform has prompted rashes, blisters, disagreements and shows of enthusiasm, though the latter are less frequent than he would like.

Ordonez is a typical "baron," just as there are typical "plumbers," just as there is a "company." It sounds like a war of words, but it is a war, a political war and a very hard-fought one.

[Question] Tell me, what does the word "baron" mean to you?

[Answer] It is a typical political party expression, but it has no tradition in Spain and, therefore, sounds picturesque. In the UCD the barons are the chieftains [cabecillas], and this word is used somewhat by design.

[Question] And what about the plumbers? What are they?

[Answer] Ha, ha...The name comes from Nixon's famous plumbers, and the word has caught on big here. However, as was to be expected, and I am even amazed that it has taken so long, the real plumbers have protested because they feel encroached upon.

[Question] And what about "the company"?

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[Answer] The company is a term that was first used, somewhat humorously, by Martin Villa. It means the president and the people around him. It is somewhat like the expression "the head of the advertising agency."

[Question] And how are the barons, plumbers and the company conducting politics in our country?

[Answer] Politics in this country is faced with much more serious problems than those words might indicate. The problems are much more serious. They do not hinge solely on certain figures in the government party; the political, social, etc problems that we are all familiar with involve more prominent people than them.

[Question] But at this point in the transition the Spanish people feel somewhat insecure: the economy is doing badly, the outlook is not too clear. What can the UCD tell the people?

[Answer] What most concerns me is that the country is more afraid of the future than it ought to be. Let me explain. The fear of the future is realistic, because since 1974 Spain has been undergoing an extremely serious crisis, the consequences of which are beginning to make themselves felt right now. This year we have begun to pay for the crisis, to pay for it in the form of taxes, in the form of very high oil prices, in the form of unemployment, in other words, to pay all of the bills that accumulated because we did not undertake the necessary changes in time.

[Question] And especially paying more to the Treasury...

[Answer] Well, to the Treasury that means unemployment payments, all of the subsidies and transfers, the shoring up policy, the serious problems posed by an international crisis of this scope... So then, this fear of the future could paralyze the Spanish people and bring the country to a total standstill, in the sense that a number of questions are being posed to us, and instead of seeking answers, we just wait for the questions to cease being posed.

[Question] Is the crisis going to pass?

[Answer] The country is at a standstill, waiting for the crisis to pass. But the crisis is not going to pass. We are the ones who have to resolve the crisis. When all is said and done, the policy that we are pursuing is not a policy for overcoming the crisis, which would require a gigantic effort; it is a policy to administer, to anesthetize the crisis, which has its limits, and we are now beginning to notice that the crisis hurts.

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[Question] That is a Social Democrat diagnosis. But does the entire UCD see it that way?

[Answer] Probably most of it does, I think. They often ask me: "What is a politician like you doing in a party like this?" And I always answer: "There are a lot of people like me in a party like this..." What I mean is that most people in my party think that a conservative solution to the crisis is not enough. The problem before us is not a problem of interventionism versus liberalism, as people would have us believe. The problem posed by the crisis is conservative policy versus a policy of change. That is why I abstain from the liberal-interventionist dialectic. The choice is between conservative policy and a policy of change. What the country needs is a policy of change. Mrs Thatcher's conservative policy has been a failure in England. The Germans are succeeding in Germany with a policy of change and public sector activity; the public sector in Germany accounts for 50 percent of the gross domestic product. The public sector must play a role, but it must do so properly and based on a program.

[Question] That is what a man who instituted a fiscal reform says...

[Answer] That is what a Social Democrat says.

[Question] But you must be aware that the fiscal reform has detracted from your popularity.

[Answer] You never undertake a tax reform to gain popularity; you do it because you have to. Some time ago I wrote an article entitled "The Fiscal Reform, A Solitary Gesture." I said in it that a reform like this one, which to a certain extent involves a historical and, in my judgment, extremely important change, makes sense when it is complemented. A tax reform is like an orchestra. All of the instruments have to play their music. The state has to furnish certain services, make adjustments in its spending, etc. A tax reform alone is like hearing only the drum in an orchestra, because no one likes the tax aspect. So, I do not think that it has made me less popular, except, obviously, among segments of the conservative right wing, which have resisted the reform for 40 years. We needed to establish democracy to institute a reform backed by the left.

[Question] And has the reform been complemented by other steps within the UCD?

[Answer] Only to a certain extent. I think that the problem with the tax reform is that we have not undertaken the other parallel reforms that have to complement it in public spending, certain social benefits, certain state-run activities. So then, people can see that they

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are paying more taxes but they do not quite realize why. When it is explained to them, the Spanish people catch on. I remember that 2 years ago tax revenues doubled, and there was an atmosphere of real solidarity. This shows that the people do not mind paying taxes but they want to know what they are paying for. That is the big problem. People are gradually realizing, as time goes by, that unfortunately the tax reform was unavoidable, not just a luxury or a more or less opportunistic move.

[Question] The tax reform came from a Social Democrat who holds a major post in the UCD, but the UCD isn't doing anything to complement the reform. So then, what is the Social Democrat group doing in the UCD?

[Answer] The policy of the people who think like I do is to force the UCD at all levels to carry out this very policy of modernization, change and reform, a reform of public administration, government spending, education, social security, industrial structures. In other words, everything that Spain has to do to be a modern country. I personally think that my role is to point things out and encourage people so that the party does not lapse into what I once called the conservative temptation.

[Question] Pointing things out and encouraging people, fine. But when the party's Standing Committee is summoned, everyone says yes to Mr Suarez.

[Answer] Well, we tell him yes, but...In the sense that we say yes but at the same time we ask him to be capable of rebuilding a political initiative, and I think that the last time we were perhaps successful.

[Question] In other words, the baron-conspirator parallel does not apply?

[Answer] Not at all. If some of us had wanted to conspire over these last few months, we would have had golden opportunities to do so. I am one of the individuals who have had the most opportunities for conspiracy in this country, and everyone knows quite well that I have refused to.

[Question] Agreed, you have not conspired. But the Social Democrat group is being clearly accused of straddling the fence between the UCD and the PSOE, that it is acting like the orchard farmer's dog, neither eating nor letting anyone else eat.

[Answer] I don't think it is. In my personal case, I have undertaken with total determination a very in-depth reform that has, as was to be expected, caused me a lot of headaches and, probably, meant a political sacrifice. If I wanted to play the popularity game, I would not have

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tackled a tax reform of this scope. I have always thought that a person serves in government not to do what he likes but to do his duty. Thus, I think that our faction in the UCD is doing its duty. When we have had the opportunity, we have proposed reforms in keeping with our way of looking at things. Now, with few exceptions, there are none of us in the government, and hence what we are doing is trying to spur the UCD into being what it says it is: a reformist party.

[Question] And when Fernandez Ordonez gets angry, does he threaten to use the parliamentary group that is faithful to him and that numbers around 30 deputies?

[Answer] I never threaten, never. I get angry at times, but I never threaten.

[Question] What would have to happen for the Social Democrat group to break with the UCD?

[Answer] If the UCD took a reactionary stand, then we would no longer have any role to play.

[Question] And is this possible?

[Answer] I hope not.

[Question] You just hope not?

[Answer] I am certain that it is not.

[Question] Any evidence?

[Answer] Well, so far it has not been; at this point we cannot say that the UCD is a reactionary party.

[Question] And what about Suarez? How is Suarez performing?

[Answer] Suarez is basically a man who is going to change his method of running the party and the government, in the sense that he is going to try to rely more on the party's structures. This is an endeavor that, in my judgment, could be interesting over the coming months.

[Question] What role has the Social Democrat group played in this change by the president?

[Answer] It has defended in the Standing Committee the idea that the party ought to have a more open and shared leadership. I have defended that idea personally.

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Francisco Fernandez Ordonez

[Question] The UCD Congress is going to be held in the next few months. Will the "hinge" party that is talked about so much have been formed by that time?

[Answer] I think that if you take a look at Felipe Gonzalez's speech for the censure motion and at the UCD's government program, you will see that it is very hard to come up with a third text in between the two. If the forces stay more or less as they are now, a "hinge" party is unlikely. If the UCD makes a clear-cut move towards conservative stands, the hinge party could wind up emerging.

[Question] Let's suppose that the UCD does not move towards conservatism but that it remains quiet, and then in the fall the PSOE submits another motion of censure against Suarez. What would the Social Democrat group do?

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[Answer] What we have always done, vote with the party. On major issues I will always vote with the party, and when I no longer agree with the party, I will leave.

Francisco Fernandez Ordonez is by this time an influential man in Spanish politics. He served under Franco and then resigned. He was one of the hardest-working leaders during the transition and now he is the bete noir of the conservative right wing.

[Question] And what would you tell the right wing, Mr Ordonez?

[Answer] You have to tell it what it has forgotten: that certain reforms are at times necessary to prevent revolution and that a democratic system cannot tolerate a degree of injustice that society regards as reprehensible. There is nothing more revolutionary than an obstinately conservative approach.

Fernandez Ordonez has no direct responsibilities inside the administration, but he does in Parliament. The past legislative year was very intense and gratifying to him: he got through a major law, the Autonomous Communities Financing Law.

And amid his trips and speeches, he even had time to write a book: "Spain Is Necessary."

[Question] What did Fernandez Ordonez want to say in this book?

[Answer] Basically, something quite elementary, that Spain is necessary, that I believe in Spain, even if...

[Question] Even if you wind up sounding like Manuel Fraga Iribarne?

[Answer] Even if I sound like Fraga...I probably sound like Fraga on some things. But I believe in Spain, I obviously believe that Spain is necessary. I think that in these times of crisis, when societies are disintegrating, when tribes abandon their fields and return to their nests, in these times of decay perhaps all of us have an obligation to defend this asset of ours. That is why the word Spain does not frighten me; on the contrary, I am pleased to bring it up.

[Question] And from your vantage point as a politician and an intellectual, how do you view Spanish society?

[Answer] What defines it best is what I have called "historical asynchronism." Spain is a country that has been late in arriving at almost everything in history. It arrived late at part of the 18th and 19th centuries. Spain found out late about the last world economic crisis. The big problem is finding out whether Spain is capable of making that enormous effort to modernize itself, to transform itself,

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whether we are still creative. There has always been a struggle in Spain between conservative forces and the forces of change. The history of our reformers, many of whom died in exile, is pathetic.

[Question] And couldn't that also turn out to be the fate of the UCD reformers?

[Answer] No, because I do not think that there will be any more exiles. That is over and done with. I think that our democracy is irreversible. We are going to defend it tooth and nail.

And with verses, if necessary, because Fernandez Ordonez is almost never ashamed of saying that he writes poetry, that he is regarded as "enlightened," a friend of writers, poets, artists, an avid reader of Jorge Luis Borges, "who is a delight."

[Question] And if this is how politics is doing, what about culture, Mr Ordonez?

[Answer] Throughout Europe we are going through a phase that I have called mannerist. Few new ideas are developed; there is a certain degree of overall decadence, and no great musical, literary or art works are produced, which does not mean that there are no great artists, because there are.

[Question] And what about Spain specifically?

[Answer] Spanish culture, and in this I agree with the great Mexican writer Octavio Paz, has long been eccentric. We did not have a 18th century, or a British liberal industrial revolution or a French liberal revolution. Therefore, we are not familiar with political critiques or the Enlightenment. All of this gave rise to a very strange 19th century in Spain, both in culture and in politics.

Amid speeches, meetings of the UCD Standing Committee, readings of Borges and Umbral's latest novel, Ordonez still has time to read "The Society That Adds Up to Nothing." This is an American book that agrees on many points with "Spain Is Necessary" and that "shows that everything now happening to the world is not just a recession but the end of an era, that the party is over. We are moving into an era of austerity, of limited growth. There are no more miracles. The issue of distribution is again in the forefront of the modern economy."

But even when he speaks these harsh words, Fernandez Ordonez does not lose a trace of hope, perhaps because he is a poet or certainly as a politician who has not lost his ethical view of things.

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He spoke smoothly, encouragingly, cheerfully during the entire interview. He gaged and weighed, almost stammered, his words only in response to this last question:

[Question] What is Suarez like?

[Answer] Suarez...Suarez...is already in the history books. He is, above all, a pragmatist and, therefore, he has more of an ability... for individual decisions than...for abstract...formulations. In this sense, Suarez is probably a one hundred percent classical politician.

[3 Aug 80, pp 19-21: Article on Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo y Bustelo, the minister for European Community Affairs]

[Text] Although he is not a member of the party's Standing Committee and does not belong to a specific ideological family, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo y Bustelo is unquestionably regarded as a baron. Furthermore, his name has always been on the lists of possible replacements for Adolfo Suarez as head of the government.

He is in charge of negotiating Spain's membership in the Common Market. He has known Suarez since 1975, when his seat happened to be beside Suarez's at the Council of Ministers, which was chaired by Carlos Arias Navarro at the time. He is 54 years old and has eight children, a modest fortune from his days in private business, a beautiful house in Somosaguas, a library of almost 15,000 volumes, a marvelous white piano that he plays almost every day, a wife who is the daughter of a former minister and whom he met when he was a student and went to argue with her father about academic grievances, and an encyclopedic knowledge, the fruit of endless hours and days of reading.

This is Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, or the method, because method is part of his way of life, of organizing himself, even of his way of looking at life and of viewing the current political situation skeptically, waggishly and distantly at the same time.

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo or the Cartesian method, the upshot of his passion for mathematics and music and the fruit of his training as an engineer.

He would like to apply a method to everything. He finds fault with Suarez because he lacks a working method and he criticizes the current political situation for the same lack of a method in explaining it. As far as he is concerned, we can emerge from the current situation only if we clearly explain what is happening, if we graphically inform the country of what home rule aims at, if we clarify our foreign

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policy, if we convince the man in the street that the economic policy we are pursuing is perhaps the only one that can be pursued, if we convince everyone that the crisis must be shouldered by all levels of income-earners.

He says: "Governing means deciding. You have to wager everything on one card. If you win, you win, and if you lose, you leave."

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo is the only minister among the UCD barons. He is also the only one who does not have any political group backing him. In other words, he has the whole party, because he was the one who named and organized the UCD in record time so that it could run at the 15 June 1977 elections.

Nevertheless, Calvo-Sotelo is not on the party's Standing Committee, that sort of government by consensus, parallel to the Council of Ministers, that President Suarez pulled out of his hat to halt the erosion of his leadership.

"I was surprised that they did not put me on the committee," he admitted to CAMBIO 16's Jose Oneto and Pedro Paramo in the drawing room of his chalet in Somosaguas, one of Madrid's most sought-after residential districts. "It surprised me because although I do not belong to a specific ideological family, whenever the press draws up a list of barons, it puts me on it because of my role in the creation of the party. Also, I have always, in fact, considered myself somewhat a member of that group."

But there is no inkling of resentment in the words of this sallow-complected man who conveys a strong sensation of aplomb, of self-assurance.

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo is, nonetheless, one of the barons most likely and qualified to replace Adolfo Suarez, should the need arise. The very reason why he was allegedly not named to the Standing Committee (his not being backed by a UCD faction) is also why he is in one of the best positions.

Trained as a highway engineer, after a brilliant career in private industry, he got into politics immediately after the disappearance of the former regime, in which he rejected a ministerial post. He and Adolfo Suarez are the only members of the first monarchy government who are still in power, in spite of all that has happened on the Spanish political scene. Although he says that he got into politics somewhat late ("You have to begin when you're young, not in your 40's like I did"), he has gained enormous experience in a short time.

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Aside from his economic experience at the head of Union de Explosivos Riotinto, S.A., RENFE or SODIGA, his year and a half as minister of relations with the European Communities has enabled him to gain an extraordinary knowledge of foreign relations. His curriculum as an experienced politician is rounded out with his indispensable input in the creation of the UCD and the 6 months that he served as party spokesman in Congress.

Few men with no ties to the Franco era can boast of such a well-rounded political record with so many possibilities for the future.

Perhaps the most negative aspect of Calvo-Sotelo is his image as a dry man in a number of circles. Those who know him somewhat do not understand where he is coming from. The fact is that he is a pleasant conversationalist and has a very refined Galician sense of humor. Though he was born in Madrid, Ribadeo (Lugo) is his sentimental home region, and its presence is felt everywhere in his house, whether in the nautical map of the estuary or the 19th century poster announcing the departure of a steamer for America.

Reading and music are his major pastimes. "It's a shame," he complains, "that when you're young, you can't afford all of the books you'd like to read and then when you can afford them all, you don't have the time to read them."

His only complaint about politics is that it has kept him away from thick books of essays. Philosophical and mathematical treatises are among his favorites.

Prominently placed in the drawing room is Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo's white piano, and on the stand is the score of Beethoven's Claire de Lune Sonata, which he bought on his last trip to Bonn. Any time is the right time for the minister to sit down at the piano and try a few measures. Spain's scorn for music is unjustifiable to him, and he reproaches Ortega y Gasset for having turned cultured Spaniards away from the world of music.

With tastes such as these, it is not surprising that Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo is more of a baron who walks around the house in slippers than a drawing room politician. "If I devoted the time I spend reading to social life, my political career would be otherwise," he says.

His reserve, which could have contributed to his image as a cold and distant politician, hides, true enough, a Cartesian nature but one that is also optimistic.

Method is fundamental for Calvo-Sotelo. It is when he discusses the current situation in Spain: "Doesn't it matter to you that I am more

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optimistic than normal?" he asks. "Because the fact is that the analysis is gloomier than reality. I can see that clearly when I get out of Madrid. When I travel to the province to preach the good news about the community, I realize that there is great vitality in this country. If everything looks so grim to us, it is simply because we are in a new era and we are applying analytical tools that belong to the past."

The country's basic problem is what he calls "the noise of freedom." "After 40 years of silence and soft background music," he explains, "everything now sounds to us like an uproar, but this is normal in a democratic system. The day that we come to accept the change as a norm, we will have reached maturity."

To Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, accepting the change means accepting it in all fields, but especially in politics, where leaders have to be replaced without trauma or violent upheavals.

"Here we are used to seeing a permanent leader. Any leader," he clarifies. "Not only are there problems with finding a replacement for Suarez, but the same also goes for Fraga, Felipe Gonzalez or Santiago Carrillo. It seems that there was a time here when the registry of leaders was opened for a few weeks and then closed for good. In a democracy, that cannot happen. The new system has to be conducive to a change of leaders."

In Adolfo Suarez's case, Calvo-Sotelo feels that 4 years in power "is a long time. I'm not saying that such a term is unusual in other democratic European countries," he immediately notes. "But during this time Suarez, in addition to resolving the normal problems of government, has had to develop programs of far-reaching consequences. This also is extraordinarily wearisome."

To Calvo-Sotelo, the problem of leaders is essentially a problem of democratic maturity. "There are leaders with special charisma that are typical of other regimes," he explains. "During the transition, these charismatic leaders have been useful here, but as the country moves forward along the democratic road, such charisma becomes less and less necessary. I have had the opportunity to speak with most of the heads of government of the European Economic Community, and practically none of them has the charisma that Suarez has here. Their replacement in their parties and in government is a natural development."

Will Adolfo Suarez be able to adapt to the new situation and govern when he has lost that charisma? The Galician that lives inside Calvo-Sotelo answers this one: "I think that he should try to, and he might succeed. But I also know that it is hard to change one's working

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Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo

method. There could be an almost unconscious tendency to believe that what has yielded such good results over 4 years does not have to be changed right now."

Calvo-Sotelo acknowledges, however, that perhaps the country has not yet evolved enough, because when alternates for the current leaders are mentioned, there is still a desire for charismatic leaders, perhaps because democracy has not yet completely permeated the parties. Some of them still have far from democratic structures and operations, such as the UCD that he founded.

"There was very little time then to think about the structure of the party," he argues. "The UCD was put together in 2 weeks, or less. We had to come up with 52 electoral lists with 8 or 9 different groups in that time."

It is along these lines that Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo explains very graphically the need for Adolfo Suarez and his fundamental role in the formation and development of the UCD. "The initial election coalition was like a fan; each rib was a different party. Suarez was the pin that tied them together," he explains. "The problem now is that people are afraid that if the pin is removed, it will be very hard to put in another one without leaving out a few ribs."

When told that a number of mass media have mentioned his name as a possible vertex of the fan, he says with a smile: "That stems from the generosity of newsmen. But, well, perhaps many people assume that I would be the pin that would leave out the fewest ribs."

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In any case, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo tends to downplay the internal tensions in the government party, whose roots, he explains, are to be found in the very formation of the UCD: "The UCD was born in reverse, and you have to bear this in mind in order to understand many of the behind-the-scenes developments. The normal thing is for a party to be formed in the opposition and to struggle for power. The opposite happened to the UCD, which was in power and is now desperately struggling to be a party."

"And I do not think that these original characteristics of the UCD are going to disappear by the next Congress," he predicts. "Life for the UCD has been complicated by ideological differences among individuals, not among factions. In this sense there has been a return to the days of the coalition."

As far as possible surprises at the Second Congress are concerned (in the sense that a number of leaders might be swept out or new strong men might emerge), Calvo-Sotelo is skeptical: "The congresses of any party, be it Spanish, German, Italian or whatever, usually do not resolve anything that is not resolved beforehand. There is scarcely any internal democracy in the UCD, and the Congress is going to suffer from that. In this regard, the Congress is merely going to reaffirm a situation that newsmen will have described in some detail long before."

He concedes, however, that there could be substantial clarifications in the party's structure. One of them could be a reassessment of the roles of government president and party chairman. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo feels that "it was alright" for Adolfo Suarez to hold down both posts "as a starting point for the party or in exceptional circumstances, but this should not be the case under normal conditions. We have to make a clear-cut distinction between the party in government and the government."

According to him, this could be applied to the Standing Committee. "The collective body of government is the Council of Ministers. I think that the existence of another collective body for the party government is more characteristic of an opposition party than of a party in power," he points out.

An issue that always confronts Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo on his trips to various European countries is whether or not the party belongs to one of the Internationals; this is a basic issue because, in his judgment, "we will not round out our image as a party until the UCD makes this decision."

"The European Parliament is beginning to be a major forum, and it is still not clear how the various groups are going to operate in it."

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There are currently two viewpoints: those who think that the political interplay will be by national blocs and (my preference) those who feel that it will be according to ideological blocs. The people who think along these lines want to know how the 58 deputies that Spain is going to contribute are going to be apportioned. That is why they are asking us to spell things out. I would think that the UCD ought to aim at just one of these Internationals."

[10 Aug 80, pp 21-23: Interview with Pio Cabanillas, by Manuel R. Mora; date and place not given]

[Text] He is a silent, cautious, word-gaging baron. He is hard-working and patient; he served under Franco and is serving in our democracy. He is one of the most astute Galicians abounding in politics. His name is Pio Cabanillas, age 56. Above all, though, he has lengthy experience. He entered politics practically holding Manuel Fraga's hand, and absolutely no one is in a position now to say where he will wind up. Cabanillas is basically a mystery.

An undersecretary, a two-time minister and a serious candidate for a third post, a man who operates out of offices and corridors, short of stature and quick of reflexes, this astute native of Pontevedra is seen by some observers as the point of reference for which way the winds are going to blow.

The winds of power, of course. This must be regarded as a very positive commentary on his political wisdom: a professional politician (and perhaps only Rodolfo Martin Villa outdoes Pio Cabanillas as a professional politician) must always know who is going to be in command.

After our interview for this continuing series of articles, during which Cabanillas had for more than an hour stammered, weighed his words and made an exercise of moderation ("because I am an endomorph and I like moderation; I am not at all given to categorical assertions or denials"), he said:

"I want to say something that I wrote down a while ago (and after finding the piece of paper with the note, he said without stammering). I do not

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think that you can gage Spanish society, or Spain or the UCD in psychological terms, that is to say, in personal terms. This is because when you employ psychology, what you are trying to do is aggressively, aggressively seek your own interest, and the UCD and the other parties are going to have to see to it that their people learn to live and act more impersonally, because the ability to replace men in both the UCD and the PSOE is becoming more patently necessary all the time. To me, this is the major indication that we are not doing well right now. We are just engaging in petty descriptions of factions, and people are going to an extreme that worries me more than anything in politics: they are getting bored and beginning to wonder worriedly whether political means are unable to meet our needs but do lend themselves to personal enmities and clashes."

This is Pio Cabanillas: gray matter, far from the glitter of lights and tinsel, but with a very clear idea of what politics is about. You do not have to press him much to give a lucid description of what he understands the profession of a politician to mean. He has a pragmatic sense of power:

"The important thing is to have input into a decision. The importance of the UCD Standing Committee as an instrument is that it has input into the decision-making process, even though at the moment of truth the final decision takes shape in just one head."

There are two very characteristic features of an old school politician, to describe him graphically: impersonality and the importance of being in the eye of the storm.

Pio Cabanillas was also one of the founders of the People's Party, along with the Count of Motrico, and the People's Party was virtually united, except for Jose Maria de Areilza, as one of the founders of the UCD.

[Question] What did the People's Party bring to the UCD?

[Answer] We brought the UCD the highest degree of personal participation. People from this party now hold down two-thirds of the posts in government. To me the key was the function that the UCD had to

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perform as a party. There are parties of ideals, of personnel, of the masses, of many kinds, but the important thing for the UCD is to start with the notion that it has a role to play as a party at the present moment, a specific function that is a key to what could be called the building of democracy in Spain.

[Question] But the UCD is made up of several factions: Liberals, Social Democrats, ect.

[Answers] There are people who supposedly represent the interests of these groups, but I do not think that the existence of these groups is so clear-cut.

[Question] They are not that clear-cut?

[Answer] No, I don't think so. I think, for example, that the bid to return to the roots of the UCD stems from certain personal political ambitions.

[Question] And what about Pio Cabanillas? Where is he within the UCD?

[Answer] The notion that the UCD was born as a party with a distinguishing function stemmed first from the fact that ideologically it reflected two, three or four approaches of the various political factions at the time, of the ideological constants of textbook parties, which are often also the parties of history. But what the UCD had to become was a party with specific functions. The party had the potential to create a democracy in Spain, and thus it had to be a quantitatively important party with a very clear-cut program, but not necessarily an overall approach to life, like the Marxist parties. The intelligent thing for the UCD to do was to function as a party of unity, solidarity, with a readily acceptable ideological stand that could be supported by as many people as possible.

[Question] If that is how things are, isn't there the possibility that the UCD will return to its roots?

[Answer] Not really. It would be a mistake to reconsider its roots. Therefore, it is a mistake, in some cases born of the political interests of a number of groups, to destroy the fabric of the union that was fundamental and that I still think is fundamental in our country.

[Question] So then what is the role of these groups?

[Answer] First of all, as far as I am concerned, none of them has the scope to become a major political group on its own. Second, none of

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them, as far as I know, has tried to split from the UCD either. Third, what each one of these groups is trying to do, in my way of looking at it, is to have its own ideology reflected most strongly in the UCD's platform and government programs, which is logical.

[Question] But that is a normal thing among party factions...

[Answer] Exactly, but the desire to have things done a certain way is muddying the issue. I contend that there is no possibility, in the political sense of the word, of a major split in the UCD. Of course I never rule out what you might call personal defiance.

[Question] Nevertheless, there are concrete warnings that if the UCD remains at a standstill, the "hinge" party could be formed.

[Answer] When a person who is a member of a political group analyzes whether it is at a standstill, it is because he is not doing whatever he can to get it moving. That is my first point. Second, if he is doing whatever he can, and I am convinced that there are many people who do not want to see the UCD at a standstill, there is a certain tendency to go around counting heads, to assume that some people are more interested in getting things moving than others, and this is not true.

[Question] And does Pio Cabanillas regard himself as a baron?

[Answer] Well, yes, I think that...I have had and will always have a tendency to be too silent. I think that I have done the least talking in the press about the UCD. But I feel that no moderately important development has passed me by completely.

[Question] But a baron in the sense that you have people behind you?

[Answer] I sincerely believe that it would be very difficult and very strange...for a person of my temperament...to call on a specific clan. But in the event that I had to one day, I think I could and I even think that I would be able to summon a surprisingly large following. I think that I have engaged in politics without having lost the attachment and understanding of the men who worked with me.

[Question] But you are the baron who is most fond of Suarez, the one who conspires against him the least.

[Answer] That could be. The anti-Suarez move did not arise, as you would expect, from within the party, but you would think that the party would have looked it over, and that was when I said that there were procedures for replacing people...

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[Question] And was that why at one of the recent meetings of the UCD Standing Committee you sided with Suarez against the other barons?

[Answer] No, in the first place, not against the other barons...As far as I know, there was no proposal to replace him. When I read accounts of what happened, well, I think that there is somewhat of a penchant for Greek tragedy. What actually happened was much more placid.

[Question] What are you referring to when you speak of the anti-Suarez move?

[Answer] I think that the anti-Suarez operation was a political operation based on a number of factors, such as the problems with the censure motion issue, opposing personal ambitions. They would rather evaluate individuals in terms of their speaking ability than in terms of their programs and ability to get things done. In a sense, our Parliament is becoming an echo chamber for speeches and word games rather than a forum for real substantive debate.

[Question] That is a harsh analysis.

[Answer] I am quite convinced at the moment that we Spanish politicians are not getting the job done.

[Question] Just because of all this verbalism?

[Answer] No. The second shortcoming is, to me, that politicians have forgotten their function. When the country is in a crisis, you cannot tell the people that all we have to do is come up with a policy of change, which is rhetoric. You have to offer the country a whole series of immediate accomplishments; you have to get away from fictitious guidelines. Third, we have formulated inoperative bylaws for the Chamber of Deputies, and this has caused all of the work in the plenary sessions to be very inefficient. We have to engage in a serious reform of the bylaws, but we might not be able to because the minorities will feel cheated and will all group together to vote for a continuation of this irrational system, and I say this with all due respect.

[Question] Could the anti-Suarez operation arise from that direction?

[Answer] Other groups obviously have a political interest in this. The fellow who succeeds in shattering the unity of the UCD will radically alter the chances for democracy to survive in Spain. By the morning after the UCD is shattered, Spain's democracy will be much more likely to fall apart. I regard it as absolutely irresponsible to resort to threats in politics. This kind of baiting (you're on the way out, you're on the way out) is politically ruinous...In my

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very humble opinion, if the people in the UCD forget that its role hinges unavoidably on maintaining unity, then they are not being true to the very essence of membership in the party.

[Question] But there is one thing about this anti-Suarez operation: many people feel that he can no longer get the job done.

[Answer] No, I think that basically, because of personalities, Suarez was mythicized a great deal as the big doer or as the big undoer of wrongs, and now he is being reproached, in contrast, for not undoing them all or not being able to undo the ones now. What he had to do politically he did quite well, but it was not a personal success. But when you call something a personal success, you also get the idea to call things personal failures. I do not think that anyone would have ever regarded Suarez as a good congressman, and so I do not think that there is any reason now to rent our garments because he is not or because there are other better ones. That is not the issue. I feel that as a party the UCD abounds in persons of rank but at the moment it has not yet developed a replacement who would not carry the risk of party defections. Thirdly, I must say in all honesty that there are very justifiable motives for the political jockeying in our group. For example, a number of people are very concerned about whether they are going to be on future party candidate lists if the chambers are dissolved.

[Question] Do you share the feeling that Suarez has to change?

[Answer] Yes, I think that Suarez has realized that it would be a good idea for him to have more group input in the decision-making process and I think that he is going to accept this, which is intelligent in a certain sense, because such a move places us barons under an obligation.

[Question] But has Suarez taken the party into account?

[Answer] In almost all cases Adolfo has accepted what we call the party-government-parliament trinity.

[Question] But has he taken them into account or has he come to accept shared decision-making because of pressure from the barons?

[Answer] No, no, I do not think that the barons can claim victory. We told Suarez that we needed a new approach, inasmuch as our political crisis was attributable not only to the UCD method of governing but also to a series of parallel causes: economic crisis, crisis of social structures, a crisis of confidence in our values...

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Pio Cabanillas

[Question] And is there or is there not a crisis in the UCD?

[Answer] I don't think so. I honestly feel that the crisis is among individuals, in relation to the positions that they would like to hold in the party. Let's not pretend that there is an enormous crisis...

[Question] But some barons decided that one of their number, Landelino Lavilla, was going to be Suarez's replacement...

[Answer] I have seen no indications of that, none at all.

[Question] But the party has problems. It is divided in Navarra, Andalucia, Extremadura, Galicia, the Canaries.

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[Answer] If there is one thing that does not sit well with me, it is inexactness. If what you mean to say is that the UCD, which is in power but is not doing much, has problems and if this is what you mean by a crisis, then there is a crisis in the UCD. To me, a crisis is something that threatens its pattern of existence as a party. I do not think that any baron is consciously trying to destroy the UCD or that the barons have consciously decided on a replacement for Suarez.

[Question] An attempt to destroy Suarez does not mean destroying the UCD.

[Answer] My argument is that greater efficiency was the aim at the meeting of the UCD Standing Committee at which Suarez agreed to share a number of functions, because the upcoming autumn was looking quite complicated. In other words, the barons are not demanding a Magna Charta. The conviction held by all of us is less dramatic than what many newsmen have described in their zeal to portray a Greek tragedy...

[Question] And recounted by many barons in their zeal to portray a Greek tragedy.

[Answer] If that is the case, then the people who have done the recounting have problems understanding how the issue has been dealt with.

Pio Cabanillas has a calm, endomorphic nature, like an old political sea lion. When asked whether he is like all Galicians, who do not know whether they are going up or down a staircase, he smiles slyly and finally winds up saying something like "with the time that I have spent in politics, if I..." But he does not finish the sentence.

Neither is he very informative when he is asked about his role in recent Spanish history.

[Question] Have you ever thought about keeping a diary?

[Answer] I am already keeping a diary. What if I told you about how the UCD was formed!

But he doesn't. Pio is taciturn and discriminatingly careful with words. He is a doctor of law, an academician, number one in the notary profession, a real estate recorder, number one registry counselor, a charter member of FEDISA [Federation of Independent Studies, Inc] and the brain behind the People's Party, one of the pivotal elements of the UCD in 1977. He is married and has one child.

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When asked about this autumn, he says that it looks troublesome, and when he is told that the UCD might hammer out a pact with minority parties or with the PSOE, he replies that that is a simplistic assertion.

To him, the progressive approach for the UCD would be to set forth 10 or 12 major goals and aim at them from now to 1983.

[Question] And what are these priorities?

[Answer] As far as political priorities are concerned, I unquestionably feel that the number one priority is determining the scope of the autonomies. Second, we have to deal with the economy in a more realistic, less descriptive manner, and thirdly, we have to spell out how the Parliament is to be accountable to the country...

Pio defended Fraga's Press Law in the then Cortes, and he was precipitously fired by Franco under the first Arias Navarro government because the press was beginning to liberate itself, with great difficulty, from the shackles of the dictatorship.

Cabanillas has an inborn ability to size up what the government is doing in this country. That is why, when asked whether Suarez is going to make it to 1983, his reply stems half from his Galician nature and half from his intuition:

"I think that he will make it to 1982 and that it is in the president's power to make it to 1983 with this Parliament... People should not forget that this is one of the subtle and, at the same time, strongest tools of a leader."

Pio Cabanillas has not forgotten this, of course.

[24 Aug 80, pp 19-21: Interview with Landelino Lavilla Alsina, president of the Congress of Deputies, by Jose Oneto and Pedro Paramo, at his congressional office; date not given]

[Text] "If necessary, the UCD is in a position to go about replacing the president of the government, Adolfo Suarez." This was the categorical assertion with which Landelino Lavilla Alsina, president of the Congress of Deputies, leader of the UCD Catholic faction and one of the most influential barons on the party's Standing Committee, began his interview with CAMBIO 16.

So far, Landelino Lavilla is the only baron who has dared to outline publicly what looks very much like

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a government program. At least that was how a number of political commentators described his talk at the Siglo XXI Club this past 16 June.

Despite this flourish, which prompted expectations in political circles, the 46-year old Landelino Lavilla is prudence personified. There is nothing at all daring about him. He wears traditional suits of traditional colors with discreet matching shirts and ties. He thinks over what he says and is careful both about the ideas he expresses and the way he expresses them, with particular heed to syntax.

Even his gestures and his manner of sitting in the armchair in his congressional office while talking to CAMBIO 16's Jose Oneto and Pedro Parama, bespeak his moderation. And he is prudent, extremely prudent when the time comes to voice a judgment on the political situation, on the government president or about his own party.

In speaking, he uses his hands as if he were conducting an orchestra, as if he were telling the violins to begin playing, and all of this at a "moderato" tempo, without shrillness, trumpets or trombones ever shattering the careful analysis that he clarifies and reclarifies again.

A devotee of the syllogism, there is one word that he repeated a thousand times during our talk: the conditional conjunction "if."

"If the party becomes convinced at a given moment that Suarez has to be replaced, it will do so. Now then, such a move obviously could not be based on internal confrontations, because removing Adolfo Suarez would be absurd today."

As far as the president of Congress is concerned, any attempt to relieve Suarez today would have to originate with the government president himself. "A solution directed by Suarez would be possible and natural and would not lead to too much internal party breakup."

[Question] But would a man like Suarez be capable of pushing for his own removal?

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[Answer] Adolfo Suarez has a complex personality, and people tend to voice judgments on it from narrow perspectives. I think that I know him well and I think that these views do not do him justice. I have seen him on occasions tackle projects with high-minded approaches and I do not see why we should rule out that one of Suarez's thoughts is that his position is not eternal and that one of his great personal political triumphs will have to be organizing the party he heads so that it can come up with alternatives when such alternatives become necessary.

[Question] Hasn't it occurred to you that you might be that alternative?

[Answer] I do not think that anyone regards himself as an alternative. If you analyze the UCD's internal situation, I do not think that anyone wants to replace Adolfo Suarez at the moment. I have not thought about the matter in those terms. I think that a party, any party has to be able to produce different individuals who can assume power when that becomes necessary. Circumstances impersonally dictate the qualifications that a candidate must have at a given moment. And the right man today might not be 6 months or 2 years from now.

[Question] There are those who say that Suarez was useful and necessary during the transition period but that he is now incapable of adapting to the method of governing dictated by the circumstances...

[Answer] I am not at all in favor of making such assessments of inborn abilities or inabilities. I think that Adolfo Suarez has proved that he has a series of abilities and I do not see why he cannot prove that he can develop the new abilities needed to cope with the new situation. When we have sought out new methods, such as shared decision-making, you hear and read comments such as that Suarez will not adjust well to that kind of government. I have a different personal story to tell about the first year of the political reform, the government in which the methods were essentially different, perhaps because the objectives were clearer. I have worked with Suarez in heading up a government in which shared decision-making worked perfectly.

Landelino Lavilla does not feel at ease when talking about the government president. You can see it. He fidgets in his chair and chain-smokes his Pall Malls.

We change the subject, and the conversation drifts to the topic of vacations, which he prefers to spend at a calm, remote spot far from bustle of daily life. He confesses that he would prefer not to travel, because even though it clears the mind, travel is tiring.

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He smiles when he talks about his four children and his daily life. He thus shatters his "stiff" image, which the press and television have helped to spread by always presenting him as the serious, stiff man in the congressional president's seat.

He is, in reality, different from that trite image. He smiles readily and frankly and is an agreeable conversationalist who rarely lets an off-color word slip out.

A counselor to the Council of State, a professor of administrative law at the University of Madrid and schooled at the institutions of the National Catholic Association of Publicists (he was president of the Catholic Publishing House), he often betrays the half-monk, half-lawyer personality that has resulted from his training, especially when he talks directly about politics. He then stretches out, takes a step backwards and tries, successfully, to look before leaping.

[Question] To what extent would Fernando Abril's resignation signal a change in the government's political strategy?

[Answer] As always, there are two factors involved in assessing such a development if, in fact, it takes place. One is our hypothesis that Fernando Abril is leaving. The other, which remains to be cleared up, is who will take charge of economic policy, under what terms and with what proposals. In the situation in which we find ourselves, it is no longer a question of changing names; it is a question of making proposals with specific objectives and clear-cut lines of action. To assess what such a change could entail, we would have to take a look at the details of the change, which we do not have now.

Nevertheless, he does not avoid giving a gloomy assessment of the party's current situation.

"There are objective facts, there are serious problems," he underscores. "They might not be more serious than in other societies but they have caught us at a juncture that has not yet completely settled out. Furthermore, in our case there are complementary factors affecting the internal workings of parties. Specifically, the UCD is in a weak position, an excessively weak position that cannot be justified either in terms of the parliamentary arithmetic or the UCD's actual political status. In any case, the last session ended with us in a psychologically weak position due to a series of developments that took place during the political year that ended in June, such as the issues of home rule and the economy or growing unemployment. All of this has triggered a certain psychological insecurity within the party that we have to get over and that we are trying to get over with the new proposals that we are trying to formulate for the fall."

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To Landelino Lavilla, the projects under way, the ones talked about in the press, the search for a stable majority and the agreements with the PSOE with regard to the home rule issue are the logical outcome of the current situation.

With regard to a possible pact with the Catalan and Basque minority parties, the president of Congress feels that "if the UCD needs X amount of deputies for an absolute majority and if such a majority is needed to keep a number of electoral promises, then it stands to reason that the UCD will seek the support of other groups with which agreements are possible."

With respect to whether such pacts with nationalist groups that are ideologically akin to the UCD might harm the regional UCD, as could be the case with the Centrists of Catalonia, Landelino Lavilla holds a firm conviction:

"There are pros and cons to any agreement. In politics, things are not as clear-cut as people would like, and the key is to emphasize the most clear-cut areas and to dispel the uncertainties. The favorable and unfavorable factors have already been analyzed, and now we must decide among the alternatives that continually present themselves."

As far as the president of Congress is concerned, the consensus that "all parties have to be in permanent agreement is gone." Nevertheless, "once the constitution was taken care of," he clarifies, "I said that we would enter a stage of dwindling and selective consensus. There are still issues, such as the autonomies, on which agreements between us and the PSOE, the big parties, are imperative, because otherwise the country will not get out of its predicament."

[Question] But what would happen if, as people are saying, the PSOE made Suarez's resignation a nonnegotiable condition?

[Answer] Well, I think that that could be a political stand to focus on certain issues. But such inflexibility could not be kept up because it would not allow the normal political interaction. It would mean the opposite of resolving political differences by democratic means.

[Question] As things now stand, would President Suarez be able to beat back another motion of censure by the Socialists?

[Answer] Given the current makeup of Congress, a motion of censure could not possibly be passed. The purpose of the constructive censure motion in the constitution is to try and lend stability to the system. It is not enough for the majority of the chamber to be against the government; you also have to come up with an alternative that satisfies that majority, and I do not think that such an alternative can be offered.

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Landelino Lavilla Alsina

Landelino Lavilla discusses this issues with the aplomb of a man who has gone over the figures a thousand times in his congressional office on San Jeronimo Avenue, a small office, its walls adorned with old tapestries, its vaulted ceiling decorated with Pompeyan frescoes. Furthermore, he stresses that developments after the congressional recess could defuse all of the threats and turn all of the analyses into midsummernight's dreams.

The push that Adolfo Suarez gives the party and the government in September will be decisive, both for the country and for the party itself. What is done or not done this autumn will determine the atmosphere at the Second UCD Congress, according to Landelino Lavilla, who assesses the UCD's development thus:

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"Basically there are operational problems, as a result of the party's origin. The UCD did not have to wait to assume power. The UCD emerged with power in its hands. In the UCD, the government came before the party. All of this has given rise to operational problems that have not yet been resolved. We have to reverse things somewhat in the UCD so that in theory and in practice we have a party from which emerges a parliamentary group from which, in turn, emerges a government, instead of a government that has a parliamentary group and below that a party. All of this is difficult, and I think that it always shows up in how the party operates."

When asked about whether it would be a good idea to have different persons as party chairman and government president, he once again speaks with prudence. A native of Lerida whose very slight Catalan accent can be detected only when he asks questions, he voices an answer here worthy of the most astute Galician:

"I would not establish the principle that they necessarily have to be linked. That depends on the situation at a given moment."

Nonetheless, after several remarks he concludes: "A party chairman who is not also government president is a very appreciable asset in arbitrating a conflict, for example, in the event that the party in power had to replace the government president."

Being president of anything is tantamount to saying that a person is the target of criticism from all sides. Landelino Lavilla, who has often been challenged by members of his own party, seems to accept this as just another facet of his job as president of Congress:

"They are inevitable. I find out about some of them in the papers. I recall that soon after becoming president I received a visit from a chief of state (I do not now remember who), and he told me: 'I have also been president of Parliament. It's a marvelous job, but there is a drawback, the problems that it creates with members of one's own party.' On the other hand, I think that it is to a certain extent inevitable that your colleagues might feel that you are carried away by a desire to be as impartial as possible and thus go overboard and benefit other groups."

"I have always said that my job as a UCD party man is to do the best I can as president of Congress, because my party and all other parties are interested in having our institutions function as well as possible."

[14 Sep 80, pp 24-25: Article on political power sharing in the UCD among Suarez and the "barons," with emphasis on Rodolfo Martin Villa]

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[Text] Four months after the spring crisis we have had to witness a second lengthy crisis. There have been delays in completing a political-economic program capable of beguiling the minority that has to lend support or meaning to the operation by which Suarez is attempting to consolidate his position. The Catalans, the representatives of that support and the members of that minority, seem to put a high price on their contribution.

After his vacation at El Grove, the government president, not visibly concerned about bringing the crisis to a denouement, returned to Madrid and began working on the program issue as a priority. Reshuffling the cabinet became a secondary concern.

Nevertheless, working out a new state of affairs involved bringing in new faces. Hence, above and beyond the parliamentary pact with the Catalan Nationalists, the individuals chosen to represent it were and are interested in finding out about the nature of this pact. Suarez's contacts with Martin Villa, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo and other "barons" as well as his lengthy talk with Roca Junyent, the Catalan spokesman in the Congress of Deputies, have confirmed and are confirming more or less well-founded assumptions regarding the nature of the reshuffle. The fact that Roca is particularly interested in heading up a ministry, in spite of his evasiveness with the press, signaled to pundits that a one-party denouement to the crisis was not a sure thing.

As far as the parliamentary pact was concerned, the Catalans had quite a bit to say about everything connected with their possible "partners." The potential presence of Democratic Coalition in the operation aimed at consolidating the government's positions displeased and upset the Catalan minority party, with its nine votes in Parliament. On the one hand, the Catalans did not want to be alone in this political venture, and on the other, deep down they rejected the participation of Democratic Coalition. The most liberal and presentable elements of this group, Areilza and Senillosa, had, with their summer self-promotion campaigns, made an understanding with Suarez, the man under fire, unlikely. Any pact between Suarez and Democratic Coalition would most likely wind up being a pact between Suarez and the most conservative and even reactionary faction of the Coalition, in other words, Fraga and his friends.

The Basque Galaxy

It is understandable that the Catalans would seek at all costs the participation of the Basque Nationalists, whose return to the main Parliament looked far from likely. But the Basque Nationalists are in another political galaxy, and the scope of their pressures on and counters to Suarez is both broader and touchier, especially after the steady worsening of the Navarra problem. We have the well-founded impression that in his latest talks with Suarez, Roca Junyent proposed

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that it would be a good idea for the UCD to pressure the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] men and not to entrust a resolution of the matter just to the good offices of the Catalan minority party. Logically, the Centrist "pressure" would entail a package of major concessions, and in this sense the Catalans would be advocating a greater government acceptance of the Basque Country's claims, just as the Catalans are seeking political conditions that would make possible a more convincing or conclusive implementation of the "Estatut," a barrage of transfers from now until December and better prospects for their state economic policy proposals.

In turn, the government had and has clearer sailing to make itself heard in Catalan minority party circles. Jordi Pujol, the minority leader of the Catalan Assembly, and his men must have the backing of the 18 votes that the Centrists have there.

The comings and goings of the major political figures after the recess have complicated an interpretation of developments. As this edition went to print, the makeup of the new cabinet was not yet clear. If people were relatively certain that it would be a one-party cabinet, that was because Roca's persistent efforts to get into the government were viewed with hostility by most of the "barons," except perhaps for Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca, who despite his moderate views regarding home rule, was the man behind Suarez's understandings with the minority parties to check the PSOE offensive. Roca Junyent had spent the summer defending Suarez's positions and, of course, seconding Perez-Llorca's plans, bringing to bear against Fernando Abril a party that, because it was bold enough to make an unnecessary compromise, has not even been able to please circles of the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia itself.

The replacement of Fernando Abril has been the catalyst of the new crisis, the second in 4 months, as we mentioned at the beginning of this article. If Moncloa had been more careful in handling its new stories and had prevented certain leaks about the resignation of the economic vice president, Suarez would now be less pressed for time and would be able to give more thought to a reshuffling of his cabinet. The UCD tried to postpone the plenary session of Congress, which will open the new session on the 9th, at the Spokesmen's Board on 2 September basically because it did not have enough time to negotiate smoothly the changes that the circumstances suggest.

Sticking to their policy of keeping the pressure on, the Socialists refused to acknowledge the need for a delay at the Spokesmen's Board. Pointing out the mistakes that the UCD had committed in making the new crisis a public opinion issue, Alfonso Guerra, the Socialist spokesman, commented to the press: "It seems as if 2 months was not enough for the UCD top brass to defuse the expectations that they themselves created."

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The Vacuum Left by Abril

In dispensing with Abril, because of a steady drifting apart that prompted the vice president's resignation, Adolfo Suarez has broken up a combination that was politically vital to him. Abril has, in fact, shored up the government's social and economic flanks by managing to hammer out a "modus vivendi" with the businessmen of the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations], negotiating settlements with the UGT [General Union of Workers] and administering the "last rites" to certain crisis-ridden companies. On another level, Abril has been Suarez's parliamentary shield, as we saw during the debate on the censure motion and in other discussions during the recent heated session of Parliament.

So difficult will his shoes be to fill that Suarez has even thought of Rodriguez Sahagun, the former head of small- and medium-size companies belonging to the CEOE, for the post at Castellana 3. Gutierrez Mellado's "rebellion" against the idea of removing Sahagun from the Defense Ministry and the apprehensions that seized the military when they heard that Martin Villa was reportedly in line for his job have prompted Suarez to rule out this duo, at least in theory.

Ministerial Shuffle

Although we cannot say who will take charge of economic affairs, other aspects of the crisis seem to be taken care of. In this regard, we can say that we have stepped into the "crisis of the 'barons,'" the understanding being that they are going to be the leading figures in it. The UCD Congress, scheduled for January, was a decisive influence in Suarez's decision to share power with his alleged internal adversaries. Time will soon tell whether he will succeed in blunting these trends or not.

With Abril leaving, the ministerial economic team is in shaky condition, considering the vice president's involvement in handling the previous crisis. It is almost certain that Economy Minister Jose Luis Leal will fall, because unlike Gamir (Commerce) and Bayon (Industry), he was not the beneficiary of a recent appointment.

Martin Villa's fate is thought-provoking "a priori." Not liked by the military in the Defense Ministry, rejected by the economists at Finance (which is apparently his major ambition for the moment), and ruled out as "supergovernor" of Catalonia, he could find himself ultimately in the Ministry of Autonomies, which is run today by Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca, in a two-tiered setup with him in charge of relations with Parliament. If this hypothesis is borne out, we would see Martin Villa in Territorial Administration, happy about his

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Rodolfo Martin Villa

direct relationship with Pujol, who would probably be in charge of ironing out remaining frictions between the new minister and the Basque Country. We emphasize, however, that this is just one of the possibilities being entertained; no decision has yet been made with regard to a reshuffle.

Perez-Llorca, though somewhat downgraded in recent months, would continue to be an indispensable element in the government as the man behind its major parliamentary plans.

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, who does not have a great "portfolio" in the business world, could, nonetheless, become the tenant at Castellana 3, if Suarez's ultimate design is not to place him in Foreign Relations, where Marcelino Oreja is in a weakened position.

Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, whose major ambition is, in fact, the Palace of Santa Cruz, could settle for heading up the Culture Ministry if he does not wind up terrorizing the Justice Ministry. Both Ricardo de la Cierva and Inigo Cavero are regarded as politically "washed up," although we should not rule out their resurrection later on.

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One instance of a "political resurrection" is the case of Pio Cabanillas, who replaced Fernando Abril over the summer in the job of accompanying the president. The loyalty demonstrated by the former information minister under Franco and the former culture minister during the monarchy, in a period marked by fierce internal harassment of Suarez could earn him a ministry without portfolio, which would be the ideal post for a man with his qualities: a skillful adviser and a mediocre representative.

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